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Even though remittances to the Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC) region are expected to slow
down by around 6 percent in 2009 before recover-
ing in 2010, their large recorded value of USD 63
billion in 2008 brings these flows to center stage as
a source of growth in times of crisis. There is cer-
tainly much to be done if governments aim at hav-
ing a proactive role in increasing the incentives for
remittances. The so-called mobile payments, which
make use of mobile technology, have the potential
of becoming an essential tool for remittances.
Firstly, while bank branches and cash machines
account for merely 10 to 20 percent of the popula-
tion in LAC on average, 80 percent in the region
currently have a mobile phone.The key element of
success of mobile payments is indeed the size of
their distribution networks. Secondly, transaction
costs of currently around 9 percent for USD 200,
can be substantially reduced by increased competi-
tion and by the low capital and operational costs of
mobile operators.
While mobile phone solutions are being used by
banks in many LAC countries such as Brasil, Chile,
Mexico and Argentina, these are mostly used to
access bank information and only in very few cases
to make payments (like Argentina and Colombia).
Moreover,these solutions are directed at those users
already having a bank account and hence are adding
a new distribution channel to the traditional ones of
bank branches and cash machines. The extent to
which bank-led models do or do not fully integrate
telecommunications solutions will define the nature
of their future clients.Banks need to make use of the
size of mobile networks (or other large distribution
networks such as supermarkets, lottery kiosks) to
cash in and cash out payments if they are to access
the unbancarised population on a large scale.On the
other hand, in LAC there are also some recent
mobile payment solutions which are solely telecom-
munications-driven (see Paraguay, Dominican Re-
public and Venezuela). In these cases, issues arise on
the compliance with financial regulation in terms of
anti-money laundering and combating financing ter-
rorism (AML/CFT), the presence of non-banking
correspondents and the blurring frontier between
payments and deposits.
In mobile payments, mobile phone operators are
essential actors in reaching the bulk of the popula-
tion, and private initiatives are the norm. In con-
trast, mobile banking requires the presence of
banks to locate deposits, and its feasibility remains
an open question. As much as both banks and
mobile operators identify mobile payments as prof-
itable services, none of them are leading the scene
in transforming mobile payments into deposits.
Hence, while the major bottleneck for mobile pay-
ments is regulatory, for mobile banking the prob-
lem is the governments’ ability and willingness to
provide the adequate incentives for private entities
to deliver these services.
Why mobile payments? 
Size of distribution networks
The key success of mobile payments is the size of
mobile phone operators’ distribution networks.
Indeed, mobile payments are more likely in those
countries that have little access to bank branches
and cash machines. Figures 1 and 2 show that across
the entire Latin American region the penetration of
these traditional payment systems averages just
10 percent. In the Caribbean countries, the penetra-
tion is slightly higher, at 20 percent in demographic
terms (Figure 1) and 40 percent in geographic terms
(Figure 2). And yet, the size of these networks is
very much lower than that of mobile phone opera-
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September 2009.tors, which already reach around 80 percent of the
population.
The comparison between Latin America and the
Caribbean, on the one hand, and Sub-Saharan
Africa, on the other, can provide us with some evi-
dence on the potential scope of mobile payments in
LAC. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the world
where mobile payments had been deployed the most
successfully by 2009. Mobile phones in this region
are providing access to communication to around
40 percent of the population, while the number of
bank branches and cash machines remains very low,
at below 10 percent.The gap between the number of
mobile phone users and the number of bank branch-
es and cash machines is two times larger in Latin
America and the Caribbean than in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as we can see in Figures 1 and 2. We could
therefore expect electronic payments to have a large
potential in the Latin American
and Caribbean region.
Figure 1 shows that in OECD
countries 6 out of 10 people have
access to some traditional means
of payment. In another perspec-
tive, Figure 2 shows that 90 per-
cent of the countries’ land area is
covered by these services. This
does not imply, however, that
mobile payments are not used in
this region.The large size of tra-
ditional payment networks in
the OECD relative to LAC and
Africa nevertheless leads to dif-
ferent business models of pay-
ments. In OECD countries mobile payments are
used by people who are already bancarised as an
additional channel through which they can access
and operate their bank account. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, mobile payments are mainly targeted at peo-
ple who are not bancarised and do not necessarily
imply bancarisation. Indeed, sucessful examples of
mobile payments in Africa are led by mobile opera-
tors: M-Pesa in Kenya and MTN Mobile in South
Africa.
In Latin American and Caribbean countries, for the
time being, mobile payments have followed a busi-
ness model close to practices in the OECD region,
offering these services to people who already have a
bank account. This type of mobile payment system 
is found in Argentina (Red Link), Colombia
(Redeban Multicolor) and Mexico (Nipper).The use
of mobile systems for payments is at an embrionic
stage when compared to the use
of this technology for receiving
alerts or accessing bank account
information. Indeed, in terms of
accessing bank information
through mobile phones, Brazil
has 474,000 users, Mexico
134,000 and Chile 87,000.
Some pioneer mobile solutions
are being implemented for peo-
ple not having previously been
bancarised. For international
payments, some initiatives are
being launched:Spain and Ecua-
dor (Halcash) and the United
States and Colombia (Celex-
press). However, in these two
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cases, the mobile contribution is
not being fully exploited. People
in the recipient countries are
being contacted by mobile
phones about the remittance,
but are still requested to access a
bank branch or cash machine to
withdraw the money.
Nevertheless, there are exam-
ples of mobile operators’ main
comparative advantage being
exploited. This is the case of
some mobile payments at the
national level: Paraguay (Tigo),
Dominican Republic (Orange),
Venezuela (Diemo) and Jamaica
(Mobile Money). These exam-
ples reflect the differences
between bank-led and mobile-driven payment sys-
tems. Bank-led mobile payments tend to use mobile
technology as an additional distribution channel;
hence they typically do not implement business solu-
tions that fully exploit mobile operators’ main con-
tribution:the availability of a large network for cash-
in and cash-out operations.
On the other other hand, mobile-driven payment
solutions target mobile phone users who are not nec-
essarily bancarised, allowing them to cash in and
cash out through the mobile network distribution
points – any kiosk or shop that sells mobile services
such as prepaid cards. To the extent to which these
mobile operators do not accept deposits and hence
payments remain in the network for a limited period
of time, financial regulation is
not fully applied.
Drop in transaction costs
High transaction costs for remit-
tances can justify the use of
mobile technology. In Figures 3
and 4 we can observe transac-
tion costs for money transfer
operators and banks, respective-
ly when sending USD 200 to
LAC countries. Each of the
points in these figures repre-
sents a precise corridor: for
example,money being sent from
Britain to Brazil or from Spain
to Colombia. We can appreciate
in both Figures 3 and 4 that
transaction costs are high: they average 7.2 percent
for money transfer operators and 11.1 percent for
banks.
In addition, whereas the costs are very concentrat-
ed in the case of money transfer operators, they are
very dispersed in the case of banks. At the upper
limit, in the corridor between the Netherlands and
Dominican Republic, banks are requesting
26.3 percent, while banks in the corridor between
the United States and El Salvador are characterised
by 3 percent transaction costs. Some precise exam-
ples can also be found between Spain and LAC.
BBVA is offering the Dinero Express service to
send remittances from Spain to LAC: up to
3,000 euros for a flat rate of 5 euros if the amount
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Figure 4account. If the client is using the product ‘cuentas
claras multipaís’, the service is free.There is a com-
mission upon receipt and the amount can be cashed
out without one having a bank account.Banco San-
tander is offering a service named Santanderenvíos
which allows up to 3 free payments per month,with
a maximum of 2,000 euros, for those clients having
a bank account.
In Figures 3 and 4 there is an exponential trend
line that highlights the development of transaction
costs with the number of money transfer operators
and banks, respectively. In Figure 3, the slope of
this line is consistent with basic economic princi-
ples: increasing competition through a larger num-
ber of operators should result in decreasing costs.
There are two clusters in the figure. A first cluster
‘low competition-high transaction costs’ with 2 to
4 money transfer operators and 9 to 13 percent
costs, and a second cluster ‘high competition-low
transaction costs’ with 8 to 14 banks and 4 to 8 per-
cent costs. In Figure 4, however, there is no clear
relationship between the degree of competition
between banks and transaction costs: the exponen-
tial line in the figure is quite straight, and even
roughly increasing.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that non-
banking competition is driving down transaction
costs in LAC, a hypothesis consistent as well with
the African experience as described in Box 1. On
the basis of this information we can anticipate that
mobile technology is more likely in countries with
a weaker presence of money transfer operators
and under any banking market structure, since in
those cases transaction costs are high. Here we can
conclude that mobile technolo-
gy can bring down costs by the
increase of non-banking com-
petition per se.
Origin country of remittances
A casual look at Table 1 reveals
that the most promising markets
for the delivery of mobile pay-
ment services can be identified
by the country from which the
migrant is sending the remit-
tance. Indeed, there is an ex-
tremely close relationship bet-
ween the country of origin and
the operator chosen for pay-
ment services. For migrants
sending remittances from Japan, the Netherlands,
Canada and France to LAC countries,the number of
money transfer operators is systematically low –
between 0 and 6 in Table 1 – and the transaction
costs for USD 200 average 15.5 percent.
For migrants sending their money from Spain, the
United States and Britain to LAC countries, the
context is significantly different. These corridors
are characterized by four times more money
transfer operators than in the previous example –
11.6 on average. In line with this result, transac-
tion costs in these corridors are more than two
times lower: 6.6 percent on average. The data
reveals that transaction costs are defined by the
country originating the remittance independently
of the country of destination. Hence, transaction
costs of remittances being sent to LAC countries
CESifo Forum 4/2009 46
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Box x 1
LAC C ahead d of f Africa: : non-banking g competition n 
driving g down n transaction n costs
By having a close look at Figure 5 and comparing it with
Figures 3 and 4, some insights can be gathered. Firstly, while
we have learned from the LAC experience that money
transfer operator competition is driving down transaction
costs, this is more likely as the degree of competition
becomes high. The number of mobile transfer operators in
LAC is 8.3, much larger than the 5.1 found in Africa. In turn,
transaction costs for money transfer operators in LAC are
2.5 percentage points lower than in Africa for USD 200:
9.7 percent versus 7.2 percent.
Secondly, bank competition is so far not having a clear
impact on transaction costs. While in Africa there are on
average 4.3 banks per corridor, two times more than in LAC,
where the number of banks is 2.4, transaction costs are alike:
12 percent for USD 200. The same conclusions can be drawn
for larger amounts. Hence, by integrating the lessons from
LAC and Africa, we can conclude that non-banking competi-
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are highly dependent on the market structure of
the payment services in countries originating the
remittance.
Table 1 could induce us to consider that the number
of money transfer operators is higher when there is
a larger volume of remittances being sent through a
channel. Indeed, one would tend to think that
Spain, the United States and Britain are the coun-
tries where transaction costs for remittances to
LAC are lower because they have a large number
of LAC migrants.At a closer look at the equivalent
data for Africa,it becomes clear that the number of
migrants in the country originating the remittance
is not closely related to the level of transaction
costs or to the degree of competition in mobile pay-
ments.
Indeed, Spain, the United States and Britain are
again in the corridors with a larger number 
of money transfer operators
(8.4 on average),and with lower
transaction costs (10.4 percent
on average). In comparison,
France (with a large number of
African migrants), South Af-
rica, the Netherlands and Ger-
many are those countries from
which migrants are sending
remittance to Africa, with an
extremely low number of
money transfer operators (be-
low 1 on average) and with high
transaction costs (16.9 percent
on average). Hence, the regula-
tory framework – the number
of money transfers operators
present – in origin countries ap-
pears to be the primary factor
defining the transaction costs in
the corridors. In those corridors
with countries of origin such as
France, Japan, Canada, South
Africa, the Netherlands and
Germany, where the prolifera-
tion of money transfer operator
competition is low, mobile pay-
ments are the most likely since
the margin for new competitors
is large.
Volume of remittances
The more promising markets for
mobile payments most probably involve the LAC
countries receiving the larger volumes of remit-
tances as presented in Table 2.Mexico is the country
that attracts by far the largest volume of remittances
(USD 24,000), equivalent to the amount sent to the
whole of South America. Besides, Mexico, Brazil
and Colombia are also large recipients of remit-
tances with volumes similar to those in Northern
and Western African countries such as Algeria,
Morocco and Nigeria, where mobile payment pilots
are to be launched shortly.
In line with the previous discussion, Table 2 high-
lights the fact that there is not a clear-cut relation-
ship between the volume of remittances in the recip-
ient country and transaction costs. Hence, we cannot
infer that corridors with higher volumes of remit-
tances are attracting more competition, causing
prices to drop.
Table e 1 1 






cost (in % of
USD 200)
Brazil Japan 0  19.71 
Dominican Republic Netherlands 2  17.14 
Haiti Canada  2 15.14
Haiti France 3 11.38
Jamaica Canada  4  14.02 
Peru Japan   6  19.92 
Surinam Netherlands 3 11.23 





Netherlands 2.8 15.50 
LAC: High presence 
of money transfer
operators
US, Spain, Britain 11.6  6.60 
Source: World Bank (2008).
Table e 2 2 
Transaction n costs s according g to o the e country y  
of f destination n of f remittances s 





costs (in % of
USD 200)
Central America Mexico   24,254  6.7 
and Mexico  El Salvador 3,328  4.1 
 Guatemala  3,557  5.8 
 Honduras 2,286  5.9 
South America   Brazil 7,373  10.5 
 Colombia 4,516  6.0 
 Ecuador 3,162  5.1 
 Peru 2,869  10.1 
Caribbean   Dominican Republic 2,739  10.0 
Source: World Bank (2008).Small amounts for urban-rural
transfers
By having a close look at Fi-
gures 6 and 7, we can see that
transaction costs increase very
rapidly, both for money transfer
operators and for banks, as the
amount being sent by the
migrant is smaller. This can be
easily understood by looking at
the gap between the exponen-
tial lines defining transaction
costs in the figures. This line is
systematically defining a gap
between USD 500 and USD 200
of at least 2 percentage points
for money transfer operators
and of above 5 for banks. In-
deed, across operators, whereas
transaction costs are around
4 to 6 percent for USD 500,they
increase to about 9 percent for
USD 200.
A more detailed analysis
reveals that banks are those
agents that request particularly
high commissions for small
amounts.We can see in Table 3
that, while transaction costs
between banks and money
transfer operators differ by
1.2 percentage points for USD
500, the divergence increases
to almost 4 percentage points
for USD 200. The gap is even
larger for African countries: 3 percent for USD
500 and 6.4 percent for USD 200.
The most plausible reason why banks are more
expensive than money transfer operators for small
amounts of transfers is that banks are focused on
a small number of wealthy customers. Small
amounts are typically sent by less wealthy cus-
tomers, however. Hence, these
small transfers would require a
change in the banks’ business
model so as to be profitable
under low margins through
economies of scale (many cus-
tomers). At the same time, this
business model should allow
the co-habitation with the 
previous portfolio of clients that generates high 
margins.
For the time being, instead of increasing their port-
folio of small clients (by standardizing transfers,
reducing delays, reducing costs, etc.), banks are
sometimes engaging in agreements with money
transfer operators. The typical exchange implies










0 5 10 15 20 25
USD 200
USD 500
Source: World Bank (2008).
TRANSACTION COSTS FOR MONEY TRANSFER OPERATORS
for sending USD 200 and USD 500













Source: World Bank (2008).
TRANSACTION COSTS FOR BANKS




Table e 3 3 
Transaction n costs s according g to o the e amount t of f remittances s 
Bank costs  
(in % of
USD 200) 









LAC 11.1  7.2 6.1 4.9 
Africa 13.3  10.1 6.9  7.1 
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offering the banks’ infrastructure against the money
transfer operators’ standardized procedures and an
added margin on usual transfer operators’ transac-
tion costs. The bank can keep its portfolio of clients
and at the same time benefit from accessing low
income customers through transfer operators.Banco
Salvadoreño, the second largest commercial bank in
El Salvador is an example of the link between
money transfer companies and banks. Banco Salva-
doreño has a presence in most US states through
strategic alliances with some of the biggest MTOs,
including Western Union and Bancomer Transfer
Services. Nevertheless, the largest examples are the
agreements between Western Union and La Poste
across many African countries.
Transaction costs still remain around 7.2 percent
when sending USD 200 through mobile transfer
operators. In addition, the typical amount of
money that a migrant in an urban area would like
to send to his family in a rural area in the same
country, would probably be often much smaller.
Mobile technology can do much to reduce these
costs for very small amounts. Indeed, when you
take the most expanded example of mobile trans-
fers so far, in Kenya, it is 10 times cheaper to send
9 euros through the mobile network M-Pesa than
through a money transfer operator. Whereas 
M-Pesa requests a commission of 5 percent, Wes-
tern Union demands 50 percent.
The reason why mobile phone operators can be so
advantageous for small amounts is that the distrib-
ution networks are already available: mobile
phones reach 80 percent of end users to make
requests and receive information and mobile
phone agents (kiosks,supermarkets,etc.) are large-
ly available to cash in and cash
out. Not only infrastructure
costs but also operational costs
are low, as the network agents
are already making their living
with other activities and typi-
cally receive just a commission
for the delivery of mobile pay-
ment services.
Regulation: the major bottle-
neck for mobile payments
Currently existing mobile pay-
ment models have been able to
proliferate due to regulatory
flexibility.This regulatory flexibility has enabled the
emergence of a wide range of technological solutions
under the common umbrella of mobile payments.
There are solutions that can be used by standard
mobile handsets: Unstructured Supplementary
Services Data (USSD) and SIM toolkit. The USSD
technology is being used in Paraguay (Tigo) and
allows deploying an open system independent of the
mobile network operator. SIM toolkits are used in
Mexico (Banamex and Telcel) and add a special
menu to make payments. These are proprietary sys-
tems, and only members of the mobile operator can
transfer funds. More advanced technologies require
enhanced mobile handsets. This is the case of the
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) in Mexico
(Nipper).
While these different technological solutions are
continuously growing under the close monitoring of
telecommunications and financial regulatory author-
ities, the proliferation of organizational structures to
deliver mobile payment/banking services is now
being strongly questioned.As we can see in Figure 8,
at the early stages of mobile payments some organi-
zational structures were bank-driven – Mexico
(Banamex, Telcel, Nipper) and Ecuador (Halcash);
others led by mobile operators of their own – Para-
guay (Tigo); and finally jointly developed by banks
and mobile operators – Jamaica (IDB).As activities
are growing, it appears increasingly important to be
backed up by a bank to avoid business uncertainty.
Indeed, the main issues halting the rise of mobile
payments are the compliance with financial regula-
tion in terms of anti-money laundering and combat-
ing financing terrorism (AML/CFT),the presence of
non-banking correspondents and the blurring fron-
tier between payments and deposits.
Services over banking 
stores of value
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Figure 8Among the anti-money laundering and combating
financing terrorism norms, there are features such
us ‘know your client’ (KYC), where information on
the individual making the transaction needs to be
accessed, requests that may not be straight-forward
due to the high levels of informality among clients.
There is also a need to establish limits on daily and
monthly transactions. The initial pilots, developed
by the well-known M-Pesa pioneer mobile solution
in Kenya aimed at establishing payments from
Britain, was left aside since it failed to comply with
AML/CFT.
Norms for non-banking correspondents have to be
favorable to the growth of mobile payments. The
large size of distribution networks of mobile
phone operators is their main comparative advan-
tage for payment services. Without an enabling
regulation to allow the agents of the distribution
network (e.g. kiosks, supermarkets, etc., as men-
tioned above) to cash in and cash out payments,
the key element of success of mobile phone oper-
ators remains unexploited. Typically, this regula-
tion should prescribe who can be a non-banking
correspondent, which activities can be handled,
whether an agent can belong to different net-
works,who is responsible in case of conflict,where
confidential information on clients is stored, and
which are the security measures, to mention a few
of the issues.
Fortunately, there exists regulation of non-banking
correspondents across a large number of LAC
countries:Brazil (1973),Bolivia (2000),Peru (2005),
Colombia (2006), Ecuador (2008) and Mexico
(2008). Brazil has the most extended non-banking
correspondent networks with
32,100 points of service (super-
markets, lottery kiosks) across
the country to deliver Caixa
Econômica Federal, Bradesco,
Lemon Bank and Banco Popu-
lar services.
The third regulatory issue that is
constraining the development of
mobile payments is the blurring
frontier between payments and
deposits. Most of the current
operators delivering mobile pay-
ments highlight the fact that
they are not accepting deposits
so as to avoid financial regula-
tion. However, the difference
between providing payment or deposit services
merely depends on the time that the money spends
in the system.
From mobile payments to mobile banking?
Figure 9 shows clearly that bancarisation is a house-
hold issue.While the share of small firms with bank
loans is fairly similar across South America, Central
America and the OECD countries, the share of
households having bank accounta differs significant-
ly. In the OECD more than 80 percent of the popu-
lation has a bank account, in South and Central
America this number drops to 29 and 10 percent,
respectively. If we match the lack of households’
access to bank accounts in LAC, with the fact that
mobile phone payments are basically targeting this
segment of the population, mobile technology could
be a good catalyst for raising the level of bancarisa-
tion.While 8 out of 10 people in LAC have a mobile
phone, only around 80 percent are bancarised on
average.
Another feature by which bancarisation may be pro-
moted by mobile technology is that mobile payments
are allowing to trace a history of the client’s activi-
ties, which can be used by financial entities to deliv-
er loans to those clients with no collateral and no
banking history. Even though payment history can
help in granting loans,final decisions are expected to
probably still rely on face-to-face contact. In build-
ing trust networks the widely predominant physical
interaction remains important. Loans are granted
depending on soft information that can only be gath-
ered by direct interaction, while hard information
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(sex, age, amount, frequency, for example) is regis-
tered by payments.
It is fundamental to stress at this point that the
growth of mobile money activities has so far been
related to payments.These activities have only mar-
ginally targeted the bancarisation of the popula-
tion. The main issue here is that banks and mobile
operators are making profits through payments.
Banks have largely refrained from converting
remittances into deposits, due to the higher admin-
sitrative costs and lower margin of managing a
large number of very small deposits. Some mobile
operators have expressed their unwillingness to
move from payments to deposits, which would
imply having to comply with stronger financial reg-
ulation, a higher administrative burden and limited
profits as compared to the instant benefits from
payments. It is clear that without the appropriate
incentives by government authorities, the degree of
bancarisation will not be increased,at least not on a
large scale.
LAC could replicate the experiences of some coun-
tries that have a long tradition of migration and
that have applied the appropriate incentives for
bancarisation.This is the case,for example,of India,
Marocco, the Philippines and Pakistan, where
banks have been opening branches in the countries
of origin, enabling the migrant to hold bank
accounts both in the country of origin of the remit-
tance and in that of destination. Incentives given
for migrants to bancarise the money have been:
high interest rates, foreign currency denomination,
tax exemptions, cash out at low cost in the destina-
tion country,to mention a few.In contrast,six coun-
tries in LAC (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Peru and Venezuela) have recently levied taxes on
financial transactions that were meant to be tempo-
rary but have been extended due to the volume of
revenue that has been collected. More specifically,
Colombia is taxing remittances being sent and
Bolivia and Brazil are taxing those received in their
countries.
References
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt and M. S. Martinez Peria (2005),
Reaching Out: Access to and Use of Banking Services across
Countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3754.
Analistas Financieros Internacionales (2009), Telefonía Móvil y
Desarrollo Financiero en América Latina, Fundación Telefónica,
Barcelona.
OECD (2009a), “Innovation and New Technologies”, in: African
Economic Outlook 2008/2009, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2009b), “Remittances and Financial Development”, in:
Latin American Economic Outlook 2008/2009, Paris: OECD.